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Abstract 
 The need for this study arose from the thesis that infrastructure 
megaprojects are often delivered over budget, behind schedule, with benefit 
shortfalls, over and over again. Many studies have been conducted towards 
this conclusion but these studies have not included Kenya which is 
increasingly adopting megaprojects as a model for delivering public goods 
and services. Through this quantitative study utilizing a cross-sectional 
census survey design, the performance of 27 completed public infrastructure 
megaprojects was assessed using broader measures of project success. The 
findings agree that these projects are delivered over budget and behind 
schedule but not with benefit shortfalls. It is also confirmed that process or 
project management success does not necessarily lead to product or 
organizational success. It is recommended that public infrastructure 
megaproject sponsors and implementers adopt project structures that allow 
for innovation through the use of advanced technology. Such structures 
should encourage the use of competitive tendering and a preference for 
pain/gain contractual arrangements to accommodate the differences in risk 
preferences between the client and the contractor, and to minimize the 
incidences of agency problem among the various stakeholders. 
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Introduction 
 Megaprojects are usually large-scale, complex ventures that cost 
billions of money, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple 
public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of 
people (Flyvbjerg, 2014). These projects are generally “greenfield” in nature 
as they often create new assets and utilize a variety of delivery models 
depending on their inherent complexity. In Kenya, megaprojects are 
increasingly used as the preferred delivery model for goods and services 
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across a range of businesses and sectors such as, healthcare, 
infrastructure, water, energy and information technology. Such projects 
include the Ksh. 327 billion Standard Gauge Railway, the Ksh. 900 billion 
Konza techno-city, the Ksh. 2 trillion LAPPSET Corridor project, the Ksh. 5 
billion Total War Against HIV/AIDS project and the Ksh. 30 billion Thika 
Superhighway, to mention but a few. These projects are often trait making 
since they are designed to ambitiously change the structure of society. 
This is in contrast with smaller and more conventional projects which 
are trait taking and they are designed to fit into pre-existing structures 
without modification (Hirschman, l995).  
 Using the description by Flyvbjerg (2014), megaprojects are not 
just magnified versions of smaller projects but are a completely different 
breed of project in terms of their level of aspiration, lead  times, 
complexity, and stakeholder involvement; implying that they are also a 
very different type of project to manage. These projects are also among the 
most complex category of project (Brady and Davies, 2014). Inherent 
complexity in megaprojects is the main source of contextual risk which is 
usually referred to as typological risk (Omonyo, 2015). The magnitude of 
this risk increases as we move from an environment of low complexity 
towards high complexity. The effectiveness of project control is usually 
affected by typological risk in such a way that as the value of the typological 
risk increases, exercising project control becomes more difficult. This could 
explain why complex megaprojects are usually delivered over budget, behind 
schedule, with benefit shortfalls, over and over again. Flyvbjerg (2011) 
characterizes this phenomenon as the “iron law” of megaprojects. The 
Project Management Institute, PMI (2011) documents projects such as the 
Boston Big Dig, Denver International Airport and the Sydney Opera House 
as examples of megaprojects that were delivered in conformity with the iron 
law of megaprojects. Flyvbjerg (2014) adds to this calamitous list several 
projects with the Egyptian Suez Canal reporting the greatest cost overrun of 
1900%, and notes that there is no end in sight for such overruns in 
megaprojects across the world.  
 In a study of 258 large scale transport infrastructure projects, 
Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl (2004) found that nine out of ten such  projects  
have cost overruns; overruns  of up to 50 percent in real terms are 
common, over 50 percent are not uncommon. In Africa, besides the 
Egyptian Suez Canal, the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline project is reported to 
have been delivered at US$ 4.2 billion up from its estimated cost of US$ 3.7, 
and with huge benefit shortfalls (Bank Information Center-BIC, 2008). The 
Basilica of Our Lady of Peace of Yamoussoukro-Ivory Coast (which at the 
time of writing this article was the largest church in the world according to 
the Guinness Book of World Records) was originally estimated to cost US$ 
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300 million. This church was delivered at US$ 360 million. Ironically, today 
the church is hardly half full (Shiferaw & Klakegg, 2012). The Bujagali Falls 
250 MW dam project in Uganda was originally estimated to cost US$ 530 
million but it was delivered in July 2012 at a cost of US$ 900 million with 
huge benefit shortfalls (International Rivers, 2012).  
 Despite these data, the growth in the use of megaprojects to deliver 
public products, services and results in Kenya has been phenomenal over the 
past few years and there appears to be no end in sight for their use. Using the 
words of Flyvbjerg (2014), what we are witnessing is a consistent movement 
from megaprojects to giga projects and finally to tera projects (such as the 
LAPSSET Corridor project). In the Government of Kenya (2013) Medium 
Term Plan, infrastructure alone has been allocated Ksh. 7.5 trillion in project 
funding for a period of 5 years, more than twice the amount allocated to all 
the other foundations of national transformation.  
 Several studies have been carried out to establish the cause of the 
bizarre performance of infrastructure megaprojects but none of these studies 
has included Kenya in its sample of countries. This is despite the fact that the 
government of Kenya has had a consistent increase in the number of 
infrastructure megaprojects since 2002. With about 31 such projects having 
been completed, and given the storyline of megaproject performance across 
the world, it is time to establish how successful these projects have been. The 
main question that this study seeks to answer is: 
 
Have public infrastructure megaprojects in Kenya been delivered 
successfully? 
 For the remainder of this article, I present a note on measures of 
project success from which model measures are identified. This is followed 
with a description of the method and results from the study. Given that 
megaproject contractual arrangements have been shown to impact outcomes, 
this study includes a section linking performance with the various contract 
types applicable to the projects surveyed. A discussion of the results is then 
presented followed with conclusion and recommendation. 
 
Measures of Project Success 
 Project success has received considerable attention within project 
management research literature over the last decades (Ika, 2009; Pinto & 
Slevin, 1988b). This attention has enabled understanding of project success 
to evolve and reach maturity (Jugdev & Muller, 2005). Indeed, there have 
been various attempts over the history of project management to define 
suitable criteria against which to anchor and measure project success 
(McLeod, Doolin & MacDonell, 2012). The most recognized of these 
measures is the long established and widely used “iron triangle” of time, cost 
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and quality (Atkinson, 1999; Cooke-Davies, 2002; de Wit, 1988, Ika, 2009; 
Jugdev, Thomas, & Delisle, 2001).  
 However, the “iron triangle” dimensions are inherently limited in 
scope (Atkinson, 1999; Ika, 2009; Wateridge, 1998). A project that satisfies 
these criteria may still be considered a failure; conversely a project that does 
not satisfy them may be considered successful (Baccarini, 1999; de Wit, 
1988, Ika, 2009). The “iron triangle” only focuses on the project 
management process and does not incorporate the views and objectives of all 
stakeholders (Atkinson, 1999; Baccarini, 1999; Bannerman, 2008; de Wit, 
1988; Jugdev & Muller, 2005; Wateridge, 1998).  
 Researchers have progressively widened the scope and constituency 
of what is meant by project success, recognizing that project success is more 
than project management success and that it needs to be measured against 
overall objectives of the project thus reflecting a distinction between the 
success of a project’s process and that of its product (Baccarini, 1999; 
Markus & Mao, 2004; Wateridge, 1998). Product success involves such 
criteria as product use, client satisfaction and client benefits (McLeod et al., 
2012).  
 Researchers are also increasingly advocating for project success 
criteria that incorporates achievement of broader set of organizational 
objectives involving benefits to the wider stakeholder base (see Shenhar, 
Dvir, & Levy, 1997; Shenhar, Dvir, Levy & Maltz, 2001; Shenhar & Dvir, 
2007; Hoegl & Gemuenden, 2001). This is plausible given that projects are a 
means of delivering the organization’s strategic objectives. Proponents of 
this school of thought advocate for inclusion of success criteria such as 
business and strategic benefits.   
 Thus, project success is now regarded as a multidimensional 
construct, with interrelated technical, economic, behavioral, business and 
strategic dimensions (Bannerman, 2008; Cao & Hoffman, 2011; Ika, 2009; 
Jugdev & Muller, 2005; Jugdev, Thomas & Delisle, 2001; Shenhar, Dvir, 
Levy & Maltz, 2001; Thomas & Fernandez, 2008). These enlarged measures 
of project success are ideal for measuring performance of megaprojects 
which in themselves are transformational and their choice is not just based 
on delivery of economic benefits but also technical, political and aesthetic 
appeal.  
 An important characteristic of megaprojects is that they are 
inherently complex. Several studies linking complexity with project success 
have confirmed that complexity predominantly determines project success 
(Meyer, 2014; Hargen & Park, 2013; O’Donnell, 2010; Shermon, 2011, 
Flyvbjerg, Holm & Buhl, 2004; Vanston & Vanston, 2004). In the project 
environment, the complexity context is usually captured by the contractual 
arrangements. The type of contract used has a bearing on how risk is handled 
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on the project and successful infrastructure megaprojects have tended to 
favor pain/gain contracts that apportion risk considerably. Such 
apportionment has been shown to increase the chances of delivery within 
budget and schedule (Brady & Davies, 2014). There is also a raging debate 
on whether the use of outcome-based contracts could lead to better results 
when compared to behavior-based contracts. 
 Arising from the review of the developments in project success 
theory, this overview adopted the framework shown in Figure 1 to measure 
the success of public infrastructural megaprojects. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptualization of Infrastructural Megaproject Success 
 
Method 
Context and Design 
 This study was operationalized through exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory research goals based on Neuman (2003) classification of 
research goals. To achieve these goals, a post-positivist philosophy 
emphasizing virtual constructionist ontology (Gauthier & Ika, 2012) was 
assumed. This philosophy utilizes both interpretivist (Bryman & Bell, 2007) 
and pragmatist (Goldkuhl, 2012) epistemologies to generate knowledge 
based on a combination of deductive and inductive approaches. The choice 
of this philosophical perspective was guided by the social world of complex 
megaprojects. In this social world, complexity is the midpoint between order 
and disorder, and megaproject management is neither a practice nor a tool 
(as is the case with projects implemented in the modern social world) but a 
rallying rhetoric in a context of power play, domination and control 
(Gauthier & Ika, 2012).  
 This study was designed to be quantitative and utilized a cross-
sectional census survey design to collect data. This design entails the 
collection of data (predominantly by questionnaire or structured interview) 
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on usually quite a lot more than one case and at a single point in time in 
order to collect a body of quantitative or quantifiable data in connection with 
two or more variables, which are then examined to detect patterns of 
association (Bryman & Bell, 2007).  
 
Population and Sample 
 This study had as its primary population public sector infrastructural 
megaprojects implemented by the government of Kenya since 2005. 
Following Flyvbjerg (2014), the minimum budget for megaprojects included 
in this study was approximately Ksh. 1 billion. Managers, team members, 
sponsors and key stakeholders of these projects constituted the population of 
respondents from whom data was collected. A total of 31 projects were 
included in this study. For each project, four respondents comprising the 
project manager, project sponsor and two project team members were 
surveyed. In total, 108 respondents participated in this study.  
 
Instrument and Data Collection 
 Fieldwork for this study utilized a project success questionnaire 
developed based on the works of Shenhar and Dvir (2001) and McLeod et al. 
(2012). Questionnaire survey is hailed to be an efficient data collection 
mechanism when the researcher knows exactly what is required and how to 
measure the variables of interest (Neuman, 2003). This questionnaire 
comprised 18 items blending open and closed ended questions on one part 
and Likert-type questions on the other part. The first part involving closed 
and open ended questions was meant to assess process success while the 
Likert-type questions assessed product and organizational success on a scale 
of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).  
 The first phase of data collection involved a pilot study on four 
projects to test the reliability and validity of the instrument. The results of the 
pilot study showed that the instrument was reliable with an overall internal 
reliability of 0.889. This value is greater than the cut-off Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.7 (Nunnally, 1978). The pilot study results also demonstrated high concept, 
construct, and external reliability, in the study instruments. The second phase 
involved using revised study instrument to collect primary data from the 
remaining 24 projects.  
 
Data Analysis  
 Collected data was processed and analyzed using Microsoft Access 
2010, IBM’s SPSS version 20 and Microsoft Excel 2010. Quantitative data 
analysis was conducted using both descriptive and inferential statistics. The 
main descriptive statistics used were the mean, standard deviation, 
coefficient of variation, indices, skewness, kurtosis and percentages. The 
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inferential statistics used were Pearson correlation coefficients and tests of 
significance. Data presentation was largely through text, figures and tables. 
  
Results 
Introduction 
 A total of 27 completed infrastructural megaprojects, representing a 
response rate of 87.1%, were surveyed as part of this research. Of these 
projects, 2 (7.4%) were from Kenya Ports Authority, 2 (7.4%) were from 
Kenya Pipeline Company, 6 (22.2%) were from Kenya Airports Authority, 3 
(11.1%) were from Kenya Power and Lighting Company, 1 (3.7%) was from 
Kenya Electricity Generating Company, 5 (18.5%) were from Kenya Urban 
Roads Authority, 1 (3.7%) was from Kenya Civil Aviation Authority, 1 
(3.7%) was from Geothermal Development Company, with the remaining 6 
(22.2%) coming from Kenya National Highways Authority.  
 All the projects surveyed had a budget at appraisal ranging from 
approximately Ksh. 1 Billion to Ksh. 40 Billion with 8 of these projects 
(29.6%) having a budget at appraisal of over Ksh. 10 Billion. The scheduled 
duration for these projects ranged from 4 months to 72 months with most 
projects having a scheduled duration of above 20 months. The project 
locations were spread across several counties in Kenya. All the projects were 
turnkey, involving a variation of Engineer-Procure-Construct (EPC) and 
Design-Build-Transfer (DBT) delivery arrangements.  
 
Process Success  
 Process success incorporates the traditional measures of efficiency 
(delivery within budget and time schedule) and quality. Efficiency was 
measured using the Cost Performance Index (CPI) and Schedule 
Performance Index (SPI) with the weighted average of these indices 
calculated to denote the overall efficiency index for the project. The CPI 
results show that 14 (52%) projects were delivered over budget, 9 (33%) 
projects were delivered on budget with the remaining 4 (15%) being 
delivered under budget. The four sets of factors that were cited for budget 
overruns, in descending order of occurrence, are: scope changes (37%); 
claims and penalties (22%); currency fluctuation and inflation (22%); and 
procurement issues (18.5%). Figure 2 summarizes these causes of cost 
overrun. 
 The main factors cited for delivery on and under budget were 
competitive tendering (14.8%) and use of imposed budgets (7.4%). 
However, in all cases where imposed budgets were used, the project scope 
was narrowed to fit into the budget. The figure below summarizes the 
identified causes of cost overruns.  
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Figure 2: Major Causes of Cost Overrun 
 
 SPI results show that of the 27 megaprojects surveyed, 22 (81%) 
were delivered behind schedule, 3 (11%) were delivered on schedule while 2 
(7%) were delivered ahead of schedule. The five sets of factors that were 
cited for schedule overruns, in order of importance, are: environmental 
factors (48%); stakeholder issues (36.8%); scope changes (33%); and 
procurement issues (33%). The main factors that were cited for delivery on 
or ahead of schedule were: use of advanced technology (18%) and inclusion 
of late delivery penalties in the contract (7%). Figure 3 summarizes the 
causes of schedule delay. 
 Simple weighted averages of the CPI and SPI values were calculated 
to give the Weighted Project Efficiency (WPE) values for each project. 
Using these values, a total of 4 (15%) megaprojects had efficiency levels 
greater or equal to 1 (100%). The rest (85%) of the megaprojects were 
delivered at efficiency levels lower than 100%. The WPE measures for each 
of the 27 megaprojects were rated based on a predetermined scale in order to 
assign a score for project efficiency. The maximum score on this scale was 5 
(WPE greater or equal to 1) and the lowest score was 1 (WPE is less or equal 
to 0.4). The results show that the 27 megaprojects had a mean of 0.91 in cost 
performance, 0.73 in schedule performance and 0.82 in overall efficiency. 
Combining these means with their standard deviations, analysis of the 
Coefficients of Variation values indicates that the schedule performance 
index had the highest relative variability (CV=0.35) compared to both cost 
performance index (CV=0.16) and overall efficiency index (CV=0.21).  
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Figure 3: Major Causes of Schedule Delay 
 
 The process success score was determined by adding a score for 
project quality to the score for project efficiency. The quality score was 
based on the effect of changes (if any) to the scope baseline and was based 
on a scale of 1 (no or low impact) to 3 (high impact). The results showed that 
6 megaprojects (22%) underwent more than three scope changes, 13 
megaprojects (48%) underwent up to 3 scope changes while 8 megaprojects 
(30%) did not undergo any scope change. Taking the maximum scores for 
efficiency and quality, the maximum possible score assigned to process 
success was 8. Table 1 summarizes the process success scores. 
 Table 2 presents the project efficiency measures by sector of the 
projects. The results in this table show that the energy sector projects had the 
lowest relative cost performance (CV=0.42) but had the highest schedule 
(CV=0.19) and overall efficiency (CV=0.14) performances. The roads sector 
scored highest on cost performance (CV=0.16) while ports (air and sea) 
projects scored lowest in both schedule performance (CV=0.47) and overall 
efficiency (CV=0.31).  
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Table 1: Process Success Scores of Public Infrastructural Megaprojects 
Project Project 
Efficiency 
Measures 
Weighted Project 
Efficiency (WPE) 
2
SPICPI
WPE

  
Assigned 
Efficiency 
Score 
Assigned 
Quality 
Score 
Process 
Success 
Score 
CPI  SPI  
1 1.00 1.50 1.25 5 3 8.00 
2 0.84 1.00 0.92 4 3 7.00 
3 1.00 0.80 0.90 4 2 6.00 
4 0.98 0.78 0.88 4 2 6.00 
5 0.81 0.69 0.59 2 1 3.00 
6 0.58 0.50 0.54 2 2 4.00 
7 1.06 1.09 1.08 5 3 8.00 
8 0.60 0.75 0.68 3 3 6.00 
9 0.86 0.24 0.55 2 2 4.00 
10 1.00 0.56 0.78 3 2 5.00 
11 0.82 0.50 0.66 3 2 5.00 
12 1.17 0.75 0.96 4 3 7.00 
13 1.00 0.80 0.90 4 2 6.00 
14 1.05 1.00 1.03 5 2 7.00 
15 1.00 0.55 0.78 3 3 6.00 
16 1.00 1.00 1.00 5 2 7.00 
17 0.92 0.90 0.91 4 3 7.00 
18 0.90 0.54 0.72 3 3 6.00 
19 1.00 0.67 0.84 4 1 5.00 
20 0.88 0.75 0.82 4 3 7.00 
21 1.00 0.50 0.75 3 2 5.00 
22 1.00 0.71 0.86 4 2 6.00 
23 0.91 0.77 0.84 4 3 7.00 
24 1.04 0.46 0.75 3 1 4.00 
25 0.60 0.78 0.69 3 1 4.00 
26 0.65 0.42 0.54 2 2 4.00 
27 0.80 0.80 0.80 2 2 4.00 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 
Mean 0.91 0.73 0.82    
STDEV 0.15 0.25 0.17    
CV 0.16 0.35 0.21    
 
Table 2: Project Efficiency by Sector 
SECTOR DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EFFICIENCY MEASURES 
CPI  SPI  WPE  
MEAN STDEV CV MEAN STDEV CV MEAN STDEV CV 
Ports 
9n  
0.85 0.17 0.20 0.79 0.37 0.47 0.80 0.25 0.31 
Energy 
7n  
0.97 0.41 0.42 0.78 0.15 0.19 0.88 0.12 0.14 
Roads 
11n  
0.91 0.15 0.16 0.66 0.19 0.28 0.79 0.12 0.15 
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Product and Organizational Success 
 Product success measures the effectiveness of the project in 
delivering a product that meets the customer requirements, improves 
customer performance, and satisfies customer needs. To assess product 
success, project customers were asked to respond to a 5-item questionnaire 
of Likert-type scale. The product success scores were determined by 
averaging the responses with the highest score being 5 and the results 
interpreted based on a predetermined scale. The results indicate the projects 
had a mean product success score of 4.09 with a standard deviation of 0.94.  
 Organizational success measures the interaction of process and 
product success to meet organizational objectives, maximize stakeholder 
value, and enhance organizational innovation capacity to deliver future 
projects. To assess organizational success, senior managers representing 
project sponsors were asked to respond to a 4-item questionnaire of Likert-
type scale. The organizational success scores were determined by averaging 
the responses with the highest score being 5. The scores were then 
interpreted based on a predetermined scale. The results indicate that the 
projects had a mean organizational score of 4.39 with a standard deviation of 
0.82. Table 3 summarizes the process, product and organizational success 
scores. 
  
Composite Success Scores 
 The composite success scores were obtained by taking the simple 
weighted average of the scores for process, product and organizational 
dimensions. With the highest score assigned to process, product and 
organizational dimensions being 8, 5, and 5 respectively, the highest possible 
mean composite score was therefore 6. The composite success scores are 
shown in Table 3. Results of descriptive statistics for the scores of the three 
dimensions of project success show that the composite success scores had 
the lowest variability with CV=0.14 while process and product success 
scores had the highest relative variability at CV=0.24 and CV=0.23, 
respectively. Project success results based on sector show that the energy 
sector projects had relatively the highest process success variability 
(CV=0.11) but had the lowest product (CV=0.45), organizational (CV=0.40) 
and composite (CV=0.28) success variability. The ports sector had the 
lowest relative process success (CV=0.29) but the highest relative product 
(CV=0.20), organizational (CV=0.13) and composite (CV=0.12) success. 
Table 4 provides a summary of project performance by sector. 
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           Table 3: Project Success Scores 
Project Code Project Success Dimensional Scores Composite Success Score 
Process Product Organizational 
1 8.00 4.40 3.80 5.40 
2 7.00 4.40 4.00 5.13 
3 6.00 5.00 5.00 5.33 
4 6.00 5.00 5.00 5.33 
5 3.00 5.00 5.00 4.33 
6 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
7 8.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 
8 6.00 3.60 3.80 4.47 
9 4.00 3.40 4.00 3.80 
10 5.00 3.80 4.00 4.27 
11 5.00 4.00 4.50 4.50 
12 7.00 1.20 2.50 3.57 
13 6.00 5.00 5.00 5.33 
14 7.00 5.00 4.80 5.60 
15 6.00 4.60 4.80 5.13 
16 7.00 4.00 5.00 5.33 
17 7.00 4.00 3.00 4.67 
18 6.00 2.00 2.00 3.33 
19 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
20 7.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 
21 5.00 4.40 4.80 4.73 
22 6.00 4.00 4.80 4.93 
23 7.00 4.20 5.00 5.40 
24 4.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 
25 4.00 4.60 5.00 4.53 
26 4.00 4.80 4.80 4.53 
27 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
 
Table 4: Project Success by Sector 
 
 This study also considered the relationship that exists among the 
three success measures. Pearson correlation was performed based on the 
performance data. The data was first checked for suitability conduct 
parametric tests such as regression and correlation analysis. This was done 
Sector Descriptive Statistics for Project Success Scores 
Process Product Organizational Composite 
 mea
n 
stde
v 
cv mea
n 
stde
v 
cv mea
n 
stde
v 
cv mea
n 
stde
v 
cv 
Ports  
9n  
6.0 1.73 0.2
9 
4.1 0.84 0.2
0 
4.4 0.57 0.1
3 
14.5 1.75 0.1
2 
Energy  
7n  
6.1 0.69 0.1
1 
3.8 1.71 0.4
5 
3.9 1.53 0.4
0 
13.2 3.64 0.2
8 
Roads 
11n
 
5.9 1.51 0.2
6 
4.0 1.18 0.2
9 
4.4 1.17 0.2
7 
14.3 2.73 0.1
9 
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using normality test of skewness and kurtosis. Skewness involves the 
symmetry of distribution of the variable about its mean, whereas kurtosis 
involves the peakedness of probability distribution of a variable. The tests 
showed that both these coefficients were within the acceptable range. 
 The correlation results showed that at 99% confidence level, all the 
three dimensional measures of success had significant positive correlation 
with the overall composite success score but this correlation was much 
stronger between product dimension and overall composite score                         
( 710.0r ). This was followed by the organizational success dimension (
630.0r ). The correlation between the process success dimension and the 
composite project success was the lowest ( 589.0r ). Further, the results 
show that there was a strong significant positive correlation between product 
success and organizational success ( 709.0r ).  
The correlation matrix is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Correlation among Success Constructs 
  Process Success Product Success Org. Success Composite 
Success 
Process 
Score 
1 -.074 -.164 .589** 
Product 
Score 
-.074 1 .709** .710** 
Org. Score -.164 .709** 1 .630** 
Composite 
Success 
.589** .710** .630** 1 
 
Linking Performance to Contractual Arrangements 
 This study also assessed project performance by linking it to the 
contractual arrangements using a checklist that contained several statements 
regarding various project contractual arrangements and risk handling. The 
respondents were required to choose all the statements in the checklist that 
applied to their individual projects.  The results show that of the 27 projects 
surveyed, 20 (74.1%)  projects utilized Fixed Price Contracts with 9 (45%) 
of these utilizing a Firm Fixed Price/Lump sum (FFP) contract and 11 (55%) 
projects utilizing Fixed Price with Economic Price Adjustment (FP-EPA) 
contract. One project (3.7%) utilized a Cost-Plus Fixed/Percentage Fee 
(CPFF/PF) contract while 6 (22.2%) projects utilized some form of Cost 
Contracts that involved re-measurement and ad-measurement based on initial 
estimates and Bill of Quantities respectively.  
 Table 6 presents the mean performance statistics of the megaprojects 
studied based on their contract types. 
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          Table 6: Project Success Based on Contract Types 
Contract Type No. of Projects Mean Success  STDEV CV 
FP-EPA 11 4.86 0.79 0.162551 
FFP 9 4.3 1.01 0.234884 
Remeasurable 6 5.11 0.60 0.117417 
CPF/PF 1 5.4 - - 
 
 The results showed that with the exception of the 1 project that 
utilized a CPF/PF contract, the projects that utilized cost contracts involving 
re-/ad-measurement had the highest mean success score at 5.11 points out of 
the possible 6.00. These projects also recorded the lowest relative variability 
(CV=0.1174) in the individual mean success scores. Using the CV values as 
measures of riskiness in project success, projects using re-/ad-measurable 
contracts had less risk followed by those utilizing FP-EPA. The projects 
utilizing FFP recorded the highest risk in mean success.   
 Since contractual arrangements are usually a means of allocating cost 
and schedule risks, this study established that of the 11 megaprojects that 
utilized FPEA contracts, 6 (54.5%) recorded cost overrun while  8 (72.7%) 
experienced schedule slippage. Of the 9 projects that utilized FFP contracts, 
4 (44.4%) experience cost overruns while 8 (88.9%) experienced schedule 
delay. Of the 6 projects that utilized re-/ad-measurable contracts, 4 (66.7%) 
were delivered over budget with 5 (83.3%) being delivered behind schedule. 
This study noted that for projects utilizing FFP contracts, project scope 
ended up being narrowed to fit into the budget. The CPF/PF contract project 
was delivered on budget but behind schedule. Table 7 summarizes cost and 
schedule performance based on types of contracts. 
Table 7: Project Efficiency by Contract Type 
Contract Type Percentage of Projects Delivered With: 
1CPI  CPI ˂1 1SPI  SPI ˂1 
FP-EPA 45.5% 54.5% 27.3% 72.7% 
FFP 55.6% 44.4% 11.1% 88.9% 
Remeasurable 33.3% 66.7% 16.7% 83.3% 
CPF/PF 100% - - 100% 
 
 Barring the results of the project utilizing CPF/PF, the results in the 
table show that projects utilizing FFP contracts recorded the highest cost 
performance (55.6%) but also recorded the lowest schedule performance 
(88.9%). Projects that utilized FP-EPA contracts exhibited the second 
highest cost performance (45.5%) but also the third lowest schedule 
performance (after 83.3% from re-/ad-measurable contract projects).  
 In 13 (48.1%) of the surveyed projects the risk of schedule delay and 
cost overrun was contractually shared between the client and contractor. Of 
these projects, 3 (11.1%) were delivered both on budget and on schedule, 5 
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(18.5%) were delivered on budget but behind schedule with the remaining 5 
(18.5%) delivered both with cost overrun and schedule delay. In 3 projects 
(11.1%) the client assumed full responsibility for all the risks and insured 
against schedule delay and cost overrun. Of these, 1 (3.7%) was delivered 
within budget and ahead of schedule, 1 (3.7%) was delivered within budget 
but behind schedule with the remaining 1 (3.7%) project delivered over 
budget but within schedule.  
 In 8 projects (29.6%) the contractor assumed full responsibility for all 
the risks and provided guarantees. Of these projects, 3 (11.1%) were 
delivered on budget, while none was delivered on schedule. In 3 projects 
(11.1%) FIDIC conditions were used and schedule and cost risks were 
handled as they occurred. Of these projects, 1 (3.7%) was delivered within 
budget while none was delivered within schedule. In summary, these results 
show that of the 24 megaprojects that either transferred risk to the contractor 
or shared it between the client and the contractor, 13 megaprojects (54.2%) 
were delivered on budget while only 3 megaprojects (12.5%) were delivered 
within schedule. Of the 3 megaprojects where the client assumed full 
responsibility for cost and schedule risk, 2 (66.7%) of these met both cost 
and schedule objectives. Generally, the results show that megaprojects that 
either transferred risk to the contractor or shared risk between the contractor 
and client had better cost performance but poor schedule performance. 
 
Discussion 
 This study used developments in project success theory to identify 
the broader measures of project success. The findings agree in part with the 
trending view that megaprojects are always delivered over budget, behind 
schedule, with benefit shortfalls, over and over again (Flyvbjerg, 2011). With 
52% of the projects having been delivered overbudget and 82% having been 
delivered behind schedule, the “iron law of megaprojects” is partly 
confirmed. Whereas existing positive literature indicates that one out of ten 
infrastructural megaprojects is delivered on budget and one out of ten 
megaprojects is delivered on schedule (Flyvbjerg, 2014), this study only 
confirms this to the extent that 11% of the projects were delivered on 
schedule.  
 This study only considered the issue of benefits from a short run 
point of view because the project appraisal documents for these projects 
showed that the project benefits shall be realized gradually over a longer 
time horizon. The short run results for project benefits, however, seem to 
disagree with the view that megaprojects are delivered with benefit 
shortfalls. All the project and senior managers/sponsors surveyed strongly 
agreed that these projects enhanced their organizations’ innovation capacity 
to deliver future projects, contributed to their organization’s direct 
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performance and maximized stakeholder value. Virtually all the 
megaprojects surveyed delivered products that were both “greenfield” and 
transformational. For instance, one of the projects surveyed at the KAA led 
to an increase in airport capacity from 50,000 passengers to 400,000 
passengers; as a result of the several megaprojects at the Jomo Kenyatta 
International Airport, the airport rating has been enhanced and direct flights 
to and from the United States of America are now being considered; cargo 
handling and capacity at the port of Mombasa has significantly increased as a 
result of the Mombasa Port Modernization project;  the road sector projects 
have been critical in reducing travel time and cost, and decongesting key 
town centres in Kenya; and more homes, schools and town centres have now 
been put on the national electricity grid. Some project products, such as the 
road network, are technological masterpieces that in themselves present 
aesthetic and economic value which puts Kenya ahead of other countries in 
the region.  
 The results showed that more of the variability in overall project 
efficiency is attributed to schedule performance than to cost performance and 
most projects that were delivered on or under budget experienced schedule 
delay. This is a key finding that may be pointing to the fact that most 
emphasis in megaproject management is directed on the cost element rather 
than to an integrated trade-off among cost, time and quality. Schedule delay 
affects both the quality of benefits and the project delivery cost. The longer 
the duration of the project the larger the cost overrun (Flyvbjerg et al., 2004).  
 The findings of this study on the main factors leading to schedule 
delay corroborate with the findings of Yang, Chu and Huang (2013). In their 
study, it was established that the most frequent cause of extended project 
duration is changed scope of work followed by weather, delayed inspection 
and acceptance from owner, and changed site conditions. On its part, this 
study identified way leave clearance and statutory requirements; scope add-
on and changes in project requirements; procurement issues and delays in 
payment, project team inexperience, stakeholder hostility and deliberate 
contractor delays; and delays in site acquisition and adverse weather; in that 
order, to be the main factors leading to schedule overrun.  
 The findings of this study also add to the growing view that 
operational excellence or process success does not necessarily imply project 
success (Baccarini, 1999; de Wit, 1988; Ika, 2009). For instance, when 
sectoral comparison was done, the ports sector had the lowest relative 
variability in process success (CV=0.29) but the highest relative variability 
in product (CV=0.20), organizational (CV=0.13) and composite (CV=0.12) 
success.  
 It is generally recognized in normative literature that the FFP is the 
most commonly used contract type (PMI, 2013). However, this study 
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established that most infrastructural megaprojects utilized FP-EPA and the 
FFP was utilized by just one third of the projects surveyed. Given the sample 
size of this study, it may be difficult to draw a conclusion against the 
postulation of normative literature. The use of FP-EPA contractual 
arrangements is backed by the long term nature of the projects studied with 
the implementation of some spanning up to 6 years. With such longer 
implementation periods, it is likely that factors outside the control of the 
client or contractor, such as inflation and currency fluctuation, may adversely 
affect cost performance.  
 The use of Fixed Price contracts is usually a tactic of transferring the 
risk of cost overrun to the contractor. In the case of FFP contracts, the entire 
risk of cost overrun is actually transferred from the client to the contractor. In 
such cases, the contractors are usually careful not to eat into their profit 
margins. The results of this study agree with this practice given that a larger 
proportion of projects that utilized FFP contracts recorded the highest cost 
performance. This was followed by projects that utilized FP-EPA, which is a 
variation of FP contracts. Despite having recorded superior cost 
performance, projects that utilized FFP recorded the highest schedule 
slippage. This could mean that utilizing FFP contracts could be a zero sum 
game-since project management success must take into account both cost 
and schedule performance. It is noted that projects whose contracts included 
late delivery penalties actually delivered on schedule. This means that the 
use of FFP should be adjusted to include late delivery penalties if the 
objectives of both cost and schedule are to be achieved simultaneously.  
 The results indicate that none of the projects utilized contractual 
arrangements with incentives for accelerated cost or schedule delivery. Such 
pain/gain contracts would include Fixed Price Incentive Fee, Cost-Plus 
Incentive Fee or Cost-Plus Award Fee. The use of these types of contracts 
incentivizes the contractor for superior delivery of the pre-agreed 
performance metrics such as schedule and cost performance (PMI, 2013). As 
such, using these types of contracts is strongly associated with superior 
project performance (Brady & Davis, 2014) since the parties involved in the 
project may prefer different actions because of their different risk 
preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, the pain/gain contractual arrangements 
can be critical in solving the agency problem that characterizes most 
employer-contractor relationships (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) on projects. 
 It is argued that transferring risk to the contractor (as in the use of 
Fixed Price contracts) offers no real protection for the client because the 
client is always accountable for cost, time, quality and safety (Brady & 
Davis, 2014). The results of this study agree with this argument given that 2 
out of the 3 projects in which the client assumed full responsibility for risk of 
cost overrun and schedule delay met their cost and schedule objectives. 
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Thus, even though numbers are still small, the findings of this study could be 
pointing to the fact that behavior-oriented contracts lead to better results than 
outcome-based contracts. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
 The findings of this study have confirmed the global finding that 
infrastructure megaprojects are delivered over budget and behind schedule. 
However, the findings of this study did not confirm the view that these 
projects are delivered with benefit shortfalls. The short- run results of 
product and organizational success indicate that these projects have largely 
been a success. Given that megaprojects have a long payback period, it will 
probably be wise to conduct another study say 10 years later to ascertain the 
benefits of these projects. This will give a clearer picture of both product and 
organizational success. The findings of this study also lead to the conclusion 
that focusing on the project management process may not necessarily assure 
product and organizational success. 
 Infrastructure megaprojects have been shown to suffer more from 
schedule delay compared to cost overrun. This is attributed to the typical 
form of contractual arrangement used in the delivery of these projects. The 
results showed that almost all the 27 infrastructural megaprojects majorly 
utilized FFP and FP-EPA contracts. Even though these contract types lead to 
increased chances of delivery within budget, they carry with them an 
inherent risk of delivery behind schedule. However, in situations where such 
contracts included late delivery penalties schedule performance was greatly 
enhanced.  
 Projects in which the client assumed responsibility for cost and 
schedule risk had higher chances of meeting both cost and schedule 
objectives than those transferring or sharing this risk. By the projects’ clients 
not assuming full responsibility for risk, they lose accountability and control 
over its triggers making the individual projects vulnerable. Transferring or 
sharing project risk increases chances of achieving cost objective but greatly 
reduces the chances of meeting schedule objective. The results showed that 
Scope changes, claims and penalties, currency fluctuation and inflation, and 
procurement issues are key factors that lead to cost overruns. Environmental 
factors, stakeholder issues, scope changes, and procurement issues were 
identified to be the main causes of schedule delay in infrastructural 
megaprojects.  
 In light of the findings of this study, it is recommended that public 
infrastructure megaproject sponsors and implementers adopt project 
structures that allow for innovation through the use of advanced technology. 
Such structures should encourage the use of competitive tendering and a 
preference for pain/gain contractual arrangements to accommodate the 
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differences in risk preferences between the client and the contractor, and to 
minimize the incidences of agency problem among the various stakeholders. 
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